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We find quantum mechanics playing a role in evolutionary dynamics
described by the notion of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). An
ESS being a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept is a stable strategy in
an evolutionary game with replicator dynamic as the underlying process.
We investigate ESSs in two and three player symmetric quantum games
played by the proposed scheme of applying ′identity′ and ′Pauli spin-flip′
operators on an initial state with classical probabilities. The mixed Nash
equilibrium (NE) we search for is not affected by a switchover between
two forms of the game, one quantized and other classical, however it is
an ESS when the game is played classically.We show no such mixed NE
exists for two player games but there is a class of three player games where
they do exist.Our results imply that an evolutionary approach originat-
ing with Darwin’s idea of natural selection can be used even for quantum
systems indicating the possibility of evolutionary algorithms utilizing en-
tanglement and other quantum effects.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium (NE), an idea developed from the analysis of non-cooperative
games, is such an equilibrium that a unilateral deviation from it leads to de-
crease in payoff. Game theorists explained evolution of complex behavior by
further refinements of NE concept and the set of refinements became so large
that eventually almost any NE could be justified in terms of someone or other’s
refinement [14].Game theorist’s attention was diverted away from elaborate def-
initions of rationality by Maynard Smith’s book Evolution and the Theory of
Games where he presented what is now called evolutionary approach. An evo-
lutionary approach can be seen as a large population model of adjustment to
a NE i.e. an adjustment of population segments by evolution as opposed to
learning. Maynard Smith introduced the idea of an Evolutionarily Stable Strat-
egy (ESS) in a seminal paper ‘The logic of animal conflict’ [5]. In rough terms,
an ESS is a strategy which, if played by almost all members of a population,
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cannot be displaced by a small invading group playing any alternative strategy.
In the usual notation P (x, y) gives the payoff to a x player against y player for
a symmetric pair-wise contest. A strategy x is said to be an ESS if for any
alternative strategy y following requirements are satisfied:
1. P (x, x) > P (y, x)
2. If P (x, x) = P (y, x) then P (x, y) > P (y, y) (1)
From this definition an ESS is a strategy which does well against copies of
itself. A successful strategy is one, which dominates the population; therefore
it will tend to meet copies of itself. Conversely, if it is not successful against
copies of itself, it will not dominate the population. An ESS will persist as the
dominant strategy through time, so that strategies observed in the real world
will tend to be ESSs.
ESSs are symmetric NE with an additional property usually called stability.
Every ESS is a NE but not conversely. The first condition of an ESS is the NE
condition for a symmetric game.
The evolutionary approach based on Darwin’s idea of natural selection can
be formulated as an algorithm called replicator dynamic. Iterations of selec-
tions from randomly mutating replicators is an essential feature of the dynamic.
The idea has been extensively used in mathematical biology to explain complex
behavioral strategies employed by even simple forms of life to continue their ex-
istence and exploit their environment efficiently. Speaking the language of game
theory the replicator dynamic says that in a population the proportion of play-
ers which play better strategies increase with time. When replicator dynamic
is the underlying process of a game the ESSs are stable against perturbations
[22].
The idea of an ESS has recently been extended to quantum domain by Iqbal
and Toor [3] for two player quantum games. The invasion by mutants utilizing
two parameter set of quantum strategies considered by Iqbal and Toor [3] is a
situation where the mutants are in possession of a better strategy space in which
the prevailing classical ESS does not even remain a NE and, therefore, invasion
is not so unusual. Such a situation does not show a relevance of the theory of
ESS in quantum game theory. Iqbal and Toor [3] proposed that the quantum
strategies should be able to upset the stability of an existing NE, expressed by
the idea of ESS, assuming that the same NE exists in both classical and quantum
version of a game. The scheme they utilized has been suggested by Marinatto
and Weber [1]. for a two player game of Battle of Sexes. The reason to use this
scheme to find ESSs in quantum games being that the notions of a mixed Nash
equilibrium (NE) and mixed ESS from evolutionary game theory can be easily
extended towards quantum games by treating these as new strategies and then
defining fitness in the usual manner of evolutionary game theory. In Marinatto
and weber’s scheme the players apply their ‘tactics’ by selecting the identity I
and Pauli spin-flip operator σx with classical probabilities, a procedure similar
to probabilistic choice between ‘pure strategies’ in evolutionary game theory. So
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that the application of I and σx was treated as pure strategies of evolutionary
game. The classical game can be reproduced by using the unentangled initial
state [1]. Iqbal and Toor [3] showed that an ESS pair can be made to appear or
disappear on choice in certain types of asymmetric games played between two
players by maneuvering the initial state while retaining the corresponding NE.
Similar procedure can also be done in a class of symmetric games [4] played
between two players making it more appropriate because the notion of an ESS
was originally defined [5] for pairwise symmetric contests.
In Marinatto and Weber’s scheme the players have not access to all quantum
mechanically possible actions. However, in this scheme the most important
aspect of a quantum game still holds i.e. the classical game is embedded in the
quantum game and classical payoffs can be recovered by using an unentangled
initial state to play the game. We do not feel it absolutely necessary that players
should always be in possession of all quantum mechanically possible actions even
though it can render better insight. The kind of situations for which we want to
use quantum game theory as a modelling tool the players are not necessarily in
possession of every imaginable quantum action. For example the stereochemical
explanation for the formation of the genetic code says that an optimized code
results from straightforward chemical affinities between individual amino acids
and their corresponding condons. When amino acids and condons are taken as
players and their chemical affinities defining constants of a quantum game it
is not always necessary that the players must be at the disposal every possible
quantum action. We agree with Marinatto and Weber that a ‘minimal choice’
enough to reproduce intact the classical results is the sole requirement [2] to
show the difference generated by the quantum effects and our object remains the
same. An improvement based on enlarging the class of allowed manipulations
is underway.
In evolutionary game theory the concept of an ESS has been extended to
multiplayer games [6]. Recently Simon et al [7] have extended the quantum
games to more than two players. Earlier they reported [8] that no maximally
entangled two-player quantum game can have equilibria when the strategy space
is SU. However coherent equilibria do occur for multiplayer case [7] and it pro-
vided us a motivation to extend the idea of ESS to multi-player quantum games
as well. Simon et al considered multi-player games to find equilibria when player
can use strategies from the set SU and a consideration of ESSs, constituting a
subset of the set of all NE, in multiplayer quantum games will be more appro-
priate with players having access to SU. However in this paper to start work
in this direction we extend the idea of ESS to three players game played via
Marinatto and Weber’s scheme keeping in view some advantages it provides.
Our purpose in this paper is to explore the behavior of the mixed NE ap-
pearing as solutions of the game from the point of view of ESSs. Our motivation
to focus on mixed strategies is that the set of ‘continuously stable’ strategies
forms a subset of the set of mixed strategies at least for two-player symmetric
contests [19][20]. Continuous stability is a refinement of evolutionary stability.
We could not find analysis of the continuous stability in three player symmet-
ric contests but in our opinion similar to two-player case continuously stable
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strategies should be mixed too in three-player case.
There has been some arguments [9][2] on the use of the term ‘strategy’
in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. In the proposed scheme the strategy is
forwarded to the players in the form of a state in 2⊗2 dimensional Hilbert space
on which the players apply their ‘tactics’. In Eisert’s scheme [26] ‘choosing a
move’ corresponds to a strategy, however, Marinatto and Weber call it ‘tactics’.
In this paper we will use Marinatto andWeber’s ‘tactics’ but still call it ‘strategy’
and what Marinatto andWeber have called ‘strategy’ we will call it ‘initial state’.
We have preferred such a choice because of two reasons:
(a): We are trying to extend a idea (ESS) used mostly by population and
mathematical biologists to quantum setting. To avoid confusion and attract
the readership of mathematical biologists as well we thought ‘necessary’ such a
change in meaning believing it does not affect the original scheme at all. Calling
a ‘tactic’ an ESS is not something familiar to people working on ESSs.
(b): Our purpose remains to find relationships between ‘entanglement’ and
ESSs in circumstances when a quantized version of a game can be reduced to the
classical game. By making the ‘initial state’ unentangled and obtaining classical
payoffs we can always get the classical ESSs and can compare it to ESSs in the
quantized version of the game. So that, a relationship between entanglement
and ESS can be obtained via a control on the parameters of the ‘initial state’.
When we say an ESS cannot be invaded we mean that it cannot be invaded by
another known strategy. ESS is always defined against other known alternative
strategies and it is always potentially vulnerable to any new strategy that might
come along. The invasion by quantum strategies in the classical pairwise game
of Prisoner’s Dilemma [3] when Defection exists as an ESS is such an example.
2 Two player case








(α, α) (β, γ)
(γ, β) (δ, δ)
)





= 1.The unitary and Hermitian operator C is defined as [1]: C |S1〉 = |S2〉,
C |S2〉 = |S1〉 and C
† = C = C−1. Let one of the players apply his ‘tactics’ by
implementing the identity operator I with probability p and C with probability
(1−p) and the second player applies I with probability q and C with probability
(1− q). The final density matrix is written as [1]:
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We write the payoff to a p player against a q player as P (p, q). Let
?
p be a












|b|2 (γ − α)−
?
p {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} ]
The mixed NE is given as:
?
p = |a|2 (β − δ) + |b|2 (γ − α)(β − δ) + (γ − α).










requirement of a continuously stable strategy (CSS)
?
p in a two player symmetric




= 0. Therefore, the set of CSSs is a subset
of the set of mixed NE. Now what about
?
p to be an ESS.
For mixed NE
?
p we write the second condition of an ESS as:
P (
?
p, q)− P (q, q) = 1(β − δ) + (γ − α)×
[(β − δ)− q {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} − |b|
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p is an ESS if {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0. This condition making
the mixed NE
?
p an ESS does not depend on |b|2 [18]. Therefore in a symmetric
two player quantum game, played by the proposed scheme of applying ‘identity’
and ‘Pauli spin-flip’ operators on an initial state, a mixed NE that survives a
change of the initial state between two forms, one of which being unentangled
(|b|
2
= 0) and the other entangled (|b|
2
6= 0), can not be an ESS in only one
form of the game.
However, the pure strategy p = 0 is an ESS when:
1. |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} > (β − δ)
2. If |b|
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{(β − δ)− (γ − α)} = (β − δ)
then q2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0
Also |b|
2
{(β − δ)− (γ − α)} ≥ (β − δ) is the NE condition.




{(γ − α)− (β − δ)} > (γ − α)
2. If |b|
2
{(γ − α)− (β − δ)} = (γ − α)
then (1 − q)2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0
Also |b|
2
{(γ − α)− (β − δ)} ≥ (γ − α) is NE condition. Now because the
ESS conditions for both of the pure strategies p = 1 and p = 0 depend on |b|2,
therefore, there can be examples of two player symmetric games for which p = 0
or p = 1 remains an ESS for only one form of the game. We can say that only
pure ESSs can be made to appear or disappear via a control on the initial state
in two player symmetric games. Examples of the games with this property are
easy to find. A class of games for which γ = α and (β− δ) < 0, gives symmetric
two player games for which the strategies p = 0 and p = 1 remain NE for all
|b|
2
∈ [0, 1] but the strategy p = 1 is not an ESS when |b|
2
= 0 and the strategy
p = 0 is not an ESS at |b|
2
= 1. Example of a class of games for which a pure
strategy forming an ESS classically does not remain ESS for some particular
value for |b|2 but still being NE for all possible |b|2 is given by Iqbal and Toor
[4].
3 Three player case
Similar to two player case we assume three players apply their ‘tactics’ by im-
plementing the identity operator I with probabilities p, q and r respectively and
the operator C with probabilities (1− p), (1− q) and (1− r) respectively on the
initial state |ψin〉. It gives rise to the final density matrix:
ρfin =
{
















































































Basic vectors of three player entangled set of strategies are: |S1S1S1〉 ,
|S2S1S1〉 , |S1S2S1〉 , |S1S1S2〉 , |S1S2S2〉 , |S2S1S2〉 , |S2S2S1〉 and |S2S2S2〉.












ab |S2S2S2〉 〈S1S1S1|+ |b|
2
|S2S2S2〉 〈S2S2S2| (5)
Payoff operators for players A, B, and C are:
(PA,B,C)oper =
α1, β1, η1 |S1S1S1〉 〈S1S1S1|+ α2, β2, η2 |S2S1S1〉 〈S2S1S1|+
α3, β3, η3 |S1S2S1〉 〈S1S2S1|+ α4, β4, η4 |S1S1S2〉 〈S1S1S2|+
α5, β5, η5 |S1S2S2〉 〈S1S2S2|+ α6, β6, η6 |S2S1S2〉 〈S2S1S2|+
α7, β7, η7 |S2S2S1〉 〈S2S2S1|+ α8, β8, η8 |S2S2S2〉 〈S2S2S2| (6)
Where the 24 constants αi, βi, ηi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 define the matrix of the three
player game. Payoffs to players A, B, and C are:





























































Here similar to two player case the classical payoffs can be obtained by mak-
ing initial state unentangled and fixing |b|
2
= 0. To make the game symmetric
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let define PA(x, y, z) be the payoff to player A when players A, B, and C play
the strategies x,y and z respectively. Following relations make payoffs to players
an identity independent quantity:
PA(x, y, z) = PA(x, z, y) = PB(y, x, z) =
PB(z, x, y) = PC(y, z, x) = PC(z, y, x) (8)
Following replacements are then needed for βi are:
β1 → α1 β2 → α3 β3 → α2 β4 → α3
β5 → α6 β6 → α5 β7 → α6 β8 → α8
Similarly for ηi the replacements are:
η1 → α1 η2 → α3 η3 → α3 η4 → α2
η5 → α6 η6 → α6 η7 → α5 η8 → α8
also α6 = α7 and α3 = α4
A symmetric game between three players, therefore, can be defined by six
constants. We take these to be α1, α2, α3, α5, α6 and, α8. The payoff now is
strategy dependent only and identity independent. No subscripts are therefore,
needed. Payoff to a p player when other two players play q and r is P (p, q, r).
The symmetric NE
?










p) ≥ 0 saying





























Where (α1 − α2) = σ, (α3 − α6) = η and (α3 − α6) = ω.




(ω − η)− |b|
2








) + (η2 − σω)(1− 2 |b|
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. The first requirement
of a continuously stable strategy (CSS)
?
p in a three player symmetric game,






= 0, similar to two player case. Therefore, CSSs
should be found in the set of mixed NE for three player symmetric contests.
Two mixed NE
?






p3are pure strategy NE. A question is which of these three NE can be
ESSs too. For the asymmetric game of battle of sexes out of three NE only two
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can be ESSs [3].We observe
?
p1is a NE without further restrictions on the matrix









be NE when further restriction are imposed on the matrix of the game.
?
p3can




∈ [0, 1]. Similarly
?
p2can be NE
when ω ≤ (ω + σ) |b|2.
The concept of an ESS has been extended to multi-player case. When mu-
tants are allowed to play only one strategy the definition of an ESS for three
players case can be written as [15]:
1. P (p, p, p) > P (q, p, p)
2. If P (p, p, p) = P (q, p, p) then P (p, q, p) > P (q, q, p) (10)
Note that p is a NE if it satisfies condition 1 against all q 6= p. Now for our
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is NE condition for the strategy
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p3 = 1.









Examples of three player symmetric games are easy to find for which a pure
strategy is a NE for the whole range |b|
2
∈ [0, 1] but not remaining an ESS for
some specific value of |b|2. An example of a class of such games is for which
σ = 0, ω < 0 and η ≤ 0. The strategy
?
p2 = 0 is a NE for all |b|
2
∈ [0, 1] but not
an ESS when |b|2 = 1.
However the mixed strategy NE
?
p1 forms the most interesting case. It makes










p1) identically zero for every strategy
p. Now
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) + (η2 − σω)
(13)
9




















ω − |b|2 (σ + ω)
}
= 0











the above square root term becomes zero we have only one mixed NE that is
not an ESS. Then, out of four possible NE in three player game only three can
be ESSs.
An interesting class of three player games is one for which η2 = σω for which




(w − η)− |b|
2
(σ + ω − 2η)
}
± |a| |b| |σ − ω| (1− 2 |b|
2
)(σ + ω − 2η).
For these games played classically we can get only one mixed NE that is not an
ESS. However for all |b|
2
different from zero we generally obtain two NE out of
which one can be an ESS.
Similar to two player case, the NE in three player symmetric game important
from the point of view of ESSs are those that can survive a change between two
initial states, one being entangled and other unentangled. Suppose
?
p1 remains
a NE for |b|
2
= 0 and some other non-zero |b|
2
. It is possible when (σ−ω)(2
?
p1−
1) = 0. One possibility is the strategy
?
p = 12 remaining a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1].
It reduces the defining quadratic equation for
?
p1 to σ + ω + 2η = 0 and it than










p = 12 even when remaining a NE for all |b|
2
∈ [0, 1] can not be an
ESS in only one version of the symmetric three player game.








p1 − (σ − η) +
√
η2 − σ22(σ − η)
}{
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p1 − (σ − η)−
√















1− 4 |b|2 (1 − |b|2)
}
(15)










= 12. Therefore, for the class of games with σ = ω and η > σ the
mixed strategies
?
p1 = (σ − η)±
√
η2 − σ22(σ − η) remain NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]
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but not ESS when |b|
2
= 12. Note that the parameter |b|
2
is not effective to
change the mixed NE and it remains same for whatever value is assigned to
|b|2. However setting |b|2 to 12 makes vanish whatever mixed ESSs are existing.
Maneuvering the initial state can thus make disappear mixed ESSs in the class
of three player symmetric games for which σ = ω and η > σ even when the
corresponding mixed NE remain intact and are not disturbed by such a control
of the initial state. No such example exists for the case of two player symmetric
games.
4 Discussion
Classical games being played in nature macroscopically are known for a long
time now. Evolutionary game theory is a subject growing out of such studies.
Recent work in biology [21] suggests nature playing classical games at micro-
level. Bacterial infections by viruses have been presented as classical game like
situations where nature prefers the dominant strategies.
We have two suggestions where our findings about relations between ESSs
and quantum games can have a relevance:
4.1 Genetic code evolution
Recent work [10] about the evolvability of the genetic code suggests that the
code, like all other features of organisms, was shaped by natural selection. The
question about the process and evolutionary mechanism by which the genetic
code was optimized is still unanswered. Two major suggested possibilities are:
(a): A large number of codes existed out of which the adaptive one was
selected.
(b): Adaptive and error-minimizing constraints gave rise to an adaptive code
via code expansion and simplification.
The second possibility of code expansion from earlier simpler forms is now
thought to be supported by much empirical and genetic evidence [12]. and
results suggest that the present genetic code was strongly influenced by natural
selection for error minimization.
Recently Patel [11] suggested quantum dynamics played a role in the DNA
replication and the optimization criteria involved in genetic information process-
ing. He considers the criteria involved as a task similar to an unsorted assembly
operation where the Grover’s database search algorithm [16] can fruitfully be
applied given the different optimal solutions for classical and quantum dynam-
ics. The assumption underlying this approach, as far we understood it, is that
an adaptive code was selected out of a large numbers that existed earlier. Recent
suggestions about natural selection being the processes for error minimization
in the mechanism of adaptive code evolution suggests an evolutionary approach
for this optimization problem. Quantum dynamics will still have a role to play
even for the suggestion of code expansion from earlier simpler forms but the
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mechanism leading to optimization will be completely different. Current evi-
dence suggesting natural selection playing a strong role [13], though footprints
of chemistry and biosythesis are not found yet, supports our view that evolu-
tionary dynamics expressed by the idea of an ESS can be utilized-in present
efforts to explain the optimization of the code. Our finding about quantum me-
chanics playing a role in ESS theory indicated the optimization was probably
controlled by quantum forces.
4.2 Quantum evolutionary algorithms
A polynomial time algorithm that can solve an NP problem is not known yet. A
viable alternative approach shown to find acceptable solutions within a reason-
able time period is the evolutionary search [23]. Iteration of selection based on
competition, random variation usually called mutation, and exploration of the
fitness landscape of possible solutions are the basic ingredients of many distinct
paradigms of evolutionary computing [24]. On the other hand superposition of
all possible solution states, unitary operator exploiting interference to enhance
the amplitude of the desired states and final measurement extracting the so-
lution are the components of quantum computing. These two approaches in
computing are believed to represent different philosophies [25]. Finding ESSs
can be easily formulated as an evolutionary algorithm with mutations occurring
within only a small proportion of the total population. In fact ESSs also con-
stitute an important technique in evolutionary computation. Our proposal that
entanglement has a role in the theory of ESSs suggests that the two philosophies
considered different can have some common grounds and can even be united.
It also hints the possibility of other evolutionary algorithms that utilize and
exploit quantum effects.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that one of the central concept describing the
dynamics of evolution called ESS can be related to entanglement believed to be
a purely quantum phenomenon. We investigated ESSs in three player quantum
games and compared it to two player games played by the proposed scheme
of applying ‘identity’ and ‘Pauli spin flip’ operators on an initial state. In the
two player symmetric game we found that a mixed ESS can not be made to
disappear by a switchover to an entangled initial state when the corresponding
NE remain intact for both forms of the game. However, for a class of three
player symmetric games it is possible to do so. We suggest the physical systems
for which our findings can have a relevance to be the DNA molecule, genetic
code, and the recent findings about evolution at the dawn of life. Another
possible relevance can be new evolutionary algorithms that exploit entangled
states or even other quantum aspects. Our idea that quantum mechanics has a
role to play in the theory of ESSs implies that Darwin’s idea of natural selection
can have a relevance even for quantum systems. We propose a quantum game
12
theoretical approach involving the notion of ESS for the analysis of the questions
about the optimization of genetic code against errors.
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